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The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Non-Economic Damages 
 
Ronen Avraham and Álvaro Bustos
1 
 





  We study the economic and legal implications of the enactment of caps on non-
economic damages on parties in conflict who know that state supreme courts may strike 
down the caps as unconstitutional within a few years of enactment. We develop a simple 
screening model where parties have symmetric expectations regarding the probability of 
a strike down and asymmetric information regarding plaintiff’s non-economic harm.  Our 
model makes several surprising predictions: First, caps may increase the length of 
resolution of disputes if the caps are low enough or the probability of a strike down is 
large enough. Second, although caps always increase the percentage of disputes that are 
settled out of courts, they do not necessarily save litigation expenses. Third, while caps 
always reduce the recoveries of plaintiffs with large claims, caps may increase recoveries 
of plaintiffs with low claims compared to their recoveries in states with no caps. We 
conclude that to increase welfare legislators have to tailor caps to the economic and 
constitutional circumstances in their state in ways which we characterize in the paper.  
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In the last few decades, dozens of different tort and medical malpractice reforms have 
been enacted, struck down, and at times, legislatively repealed or reenacted (see 
Avraham [2006a]). Indeed, tort reform is perhaps the foremost legal rights related item 
on legislative agendas.  Interest groups regularly spend hundreds of millions of dollars 
promoting or opposing reform.
2 Pressure for tort reform is also building on the federal 
level. No fewer than sixteen bills to federalize various aspects of medical malpractice law 
were debated in the Congress during the period of Republican control between 1996 and 
2006.
3  The most recent bill passed in the Senate was in 2006.
4 
One of the most popular reforms is caps on non-economic damages such as pain and 
suffering, loss of consortium, etc. By 2007, twenty-six states had enacted some type of 
cap on non-economic damages.  From 1991 to 2007 alone caps on non-economic 
damages were enacted in 14 states.  During this period, such caps were struck down by 
supreme courts in 5 states. In some states, such as Illinois, Ohio and Wisconsin, caps 
were struck down by state supreme courts and later reenacted in amended form.   
Sometimes this cycle repeated itself.
5    
Proponents of caps on non-economic damages argue that these caps will reduce 
excessive recoveries, expedite settlement, and reduce overall litigation expenses (see 
Atiya [1980] and Rubin [1993] among others).  Proponents of tort reform reason that 
reducing the uncertainty associated with unlimited jury awards for non-economic 
                                                 
2      Data on interest groups’ expenditures on tort reform is available at opensecrets.org. See 
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/issuesum.asp?txtname=Torts 
3   See 104 H.R. 3103 (1996), 104 H.R. 956 (1996), 105 H.R. 1091 (1997), 106 H.R. 2242 (1999), 
107 H.R. 2563, 107 S. 812, 107 H.R. 4600 (2002), 108 H.R. 5 (2003),108 S.2061, 108 S. 11 (2003), 108 S. 
2207, 108 H.R. 4280 (2004), 109 H.R. 534 (2005), 109 S. 366, 367, 354, 109 H.R. 5, 109 S. 22  
4   S.22, 109
th Cong. (2006). 
5   See Table 1 in the appendix for more detailed information on states that enacted and struck down 
caps on non-economic damages. For instance, Illinois enacted caps on noneconomic damages (735 ILCS 
5/2-1115.1) effective on March 9, 1995. The reform limited noneconomic damages to $500,000. However, 
on December 18, 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision from August 20, 
1996 and held that the reform violated the State Constitution (Best v. Taylor Machine Works, Inc., 689 
N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997)). On August 25, 2005 Illinois enacted again caps on non-economic damages, only 
to see them struck down on November 13, 2007 by a state trial court. (As of September 2008, the case is 
still pending before the Illinois Supreme Court.)   3
damages will facilitate out-of-court negotiation (see e.g. Atiya [1980] pp 216).  They 
argue that caps on total recovery incentivize plaintiffs to resolve disputes through less 
costly out-of-court settlements rather than gamble for big awards from costly trials. 
Indeed, Watanabe (2006) predicts that reduced uncertainty will shorten the time to 
settlement. 
On the other side, opponents of caps argue that caps often reduce recoveries for the 
most severely injured plaintiffs, thereby shifting the costs of injuries away from 
blameworthy parties and onto the most needy tort victims (see Viscusi [1991] pp 107 and 
[ALI] 1991 pp 219-20).  They also argue that caps might dilute defendants’ incentives to 
take optimal care (see Arlen [2000]).    
Neither proponents nor opponents of caps on non-economic damages have concerned 
themselves with the uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of caps tort reform. 
Historically, the constitutionality of more than half of the caps on non-economic damages 
enacted into law met legal challenges on state constitutional grounds within few years of 
enactment.
6 Indeed, there is some anecdotal evidence that both the size of the caps and 
their constitutionality are perceived to be important. As for the size of the caps a report 
by the U.S Department of Health and Human Services claims that there is a “substantial 
difference” between the impact of caps on non economic damages in “states with 
meaningful caps” and “states without meaningful caps,” where meaningful means that 
caps that are not larger than $350,000 (see U.S DHHS [2003]). As for a cap’s 
constitutionality, the chairman of the ISMIE Mutual Insurance Company, which provides 
liability insurance for doctors, has recently argued that the positive impact of tort reform 
in the states is felt only “after the Supreme Courts in these states have upheld the 
meaningful reforms." (See Parsons [2005]). 
The veil of uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of reforms between an 
enactment date and a final ruling by a state’s Supreme Court may incentivize litigants 
                                                 
6 Moreover, in recent years the practice of challenging tort reform in state court has become a much more 
coordinated. The Center for Constitutional Litigation, PC is a national law firm dedicated to challenging 
tort reforms in states and federal courts. The Center receives most of its revenues from the national trial 
lawyers’ trade group (called: The American Association of Justice) and from the states’ trial lawyer 
associations.  As of December 2007 the Center had forty tort-reform-related pending cases across the 
United States in which lawyers from the Center were helping trial lawyers nationwide to challenge tort 
reform (See, Lynne Marek, A small firm wages a '100 year war' on tort reform: Center is engaged in 40 
cases challenging limits on tort claims, National Law Journal, December 10, 2007).   4
differently than scholars generally assume.  Specifically, expectations of a strike down 
might delay settlement and consequently increase overall costs.  
In this paper we develop an asymmetric information screening model from which we 
draw inferences about the effect of caps on non-economic damages on length and cost of 
litigation and on recoveries for different types of plaintiffs.  Our model accounts for the 
size of the caps on non-economic damages as well as for the plaintiff’s idiosyncratic non-
economic harm and for both parties’ (symmetrical) expectations of the eventual strike 
down of a cap.   
In order to study the impact of caps on the time of resolution of disputes and the 
welfare of the parties, we map the negotiation process over two rounds, each divided into 
a period of settlement and a period of trial. In addition, we assume two types of plaintiffs: 
one with high non-economic harm (“high type”) and one with low non-economic harm 
(“low type”).  We include a discount factor to account for the cost of delayed resolution.  
We also consider factors addressing a defendant’s settlement and litigation costs.  Finally, 
we include factors addressing the probability that a state’s Supreme Court will strike 
down caps on non-economic damages.  These factors are important to a plaintiff’s choice 
to accept early offers or proceed to the final rounds of negotiation. 
As a baseline we first characterize the solution of the model when damages are not 
capped (“Regime NC”). We show that in this Regime the dispute is always solved in the 
first round of negotiations. As is standard in this type of model, if the probability that the 
plaintiff is a low type is small enough, the defendant makes a high settlement offer which 
is accepted by both types of plaintiffs and the dispute is settled immediately (a pooling 
equilibrium takes place). Alternatively, if the probability that the plaintiff is a low type is 
large enough, the defendant makes a low settlement offer which is only accepted by the 
low type plaintiff.  The high type plaintiff rejects the offer and litigates immediately (a 
separating equilibrium takes place).
7 
The novelty in this paper begins once we account for a cap that limits possible 
recoveries during the first round of negotiations but that may get struck down with a 
                                                 
7 We assume that courts yield accurate awards.  Thus, because high type plaintiffs go straight to litigation, 
low type plaintiffs cannot gain by mimicking high type plaintiffs (in court, low type plaintiffs only recover 
their low value claim).   5
given probability during the second round of negotiations.
8 In that case, not only does the 
defendant tend to make smaller settlement offers, but also the plaintiff, under certain 
circumstances, has incentives to reject the initial offer in hope of recovering more—
which would happen if the caps were struck down.  
Our model identifies the size of the cap and the probability of a strike down as the 
two key factors interacting to drive parties’ decisions. If the cap is high enough or the 
probability of a strike down is low enough, the parties’ decisions are equivalent to those 
in Regime NC with the exception that the maximum non-economic harm that the high 
type plaintiff can recover is equal to the cap and therefore is lower than her actual non-
economic harm.
9 We denote states with caps of this kind as Low Expected Trim Caps 
(LTC) because the plaintiff should not expect to lose much by accepting the first offer.  
Essentially, in this situation a plaintiff gains nothing by waiting:  The plaintiff’s damages 
do not much exceed the cap, or the probability of strike down is low, so that the expected 
present value of a second-round resolution is not better than the defendant’s first offer.   
On the other hand, if the cap is low enough or the probability of a strike down is high 
enough the high type always waits for the second round of negotiations, and the low 
types, knowing that, sometimes decide to mimic that decision. We denote states with caps 
of this kind as High Expected Trim caps (HTC) because the plaintiff expects to lose a 
high fraction of her recovery if she accepts the first offer.  
We start by showing that in Regime LTC, the time to settlement always decreases in 
comparison to Regime NC, whereas in Regime HTC, that time to settlement may 
increase.
10  
The reason for the first result is straightforward.  The pooling and separating 
equilibria in Regime LTC are essentially similar to those in Regime NC.  The critical 
difference is that more pooling equilibria take place in Regime LTC than in Regime NC 
                                                 
8 We consider that the strike down happens only during the trial and not during the settlement; otherwise 
trials would not take place. Explicitly considering that strike-downs take place in both instances would only 
complicate the model without adding significant value. 
9 The analysis is done for the case in which the cap lies between the values of the low and high type 
plaintiffs. We do not consider the extreme cases in which the cap is lower than the low type plaintiff or 
higher than the high type plaintiff because the predictions become trivial. 
10 Indeed, in Avraham & Bustos (2008) we found that the average time-to-settlement in states with Regime 
NC is 4.08 years, in states with Regime LTC is 3.26 and in states with Regime HTC is 4.4 years. All 
differences are significant at 1% or less.   6
because, from the perspective of the defendant, making a “high” settlement offer is 
cheaper in Regime LTC than in Regime NC.
11  Thus, more disputes are resolved by an 
initial settlement offer in Regime LTC than in Regime NC.  
The reason for the second result is less direct but still uncomplicated.  The pooling 
and separating equilibria in Regime HTC are dissimilar to those in Regime NC, because 
after the first settlement offer is made some plaintiffs in Regime HTC are incentivised to 
wait to resolve the case in future rounds of negotiations.  Specifically, it is still true that 
more pooling equilibria take place in Regime HTC than in Regime NC, which could 
imply that time to settlement decreases in Regime HTC.  Yet, in the cases in which a 
separating equilibrium occurs, many disputes are resolved in the second round of 
negotiations in Regime HTC instead of in the first round.  Determining how an increased 
number of pooling equilibria balances out with more second-round negotiations depends 
on the magnitude of the following parameters: the legal cost of settlement, the discount 
factor, and the probability of a strike down.  
We show that if the cost of settlement is small enough or the discount factor and the 
probability of a strike down are large enough the second effect dominates the first one 
and the time to settlement is larger in Regime HTC than in Regime NC.  
In order to show why, we first demonstrate that in the extreme case where the costs of 
settlement are zero, or instead the discount factor and the expected probability of a strike 
down are one, disputes are resolved later in Regime HTC than in Regime NC.  Under 
these extreme values any effect that tends to reduce the time to settlement in Regime 
HTC disappears. Second, we show that the time to settlement in Regime HTC decreases 
when the cost of settlement becomes larger or when the discount factor and the 
probability of a strike down become smaller because in all these cases the defendant has 
stronger incentives to induce a pooling equilibrium, as he expects to pay relatively less 
than in a separating equilibrium. Thus, the continuity of the parameters suggest that there 
                                                 
11 This is because a settlement offer is “high” or “low” relative to some maximum award attainable at 
trial—so that a “high” offer is cheaper under Regime LTC in which the maximum award attainable at trial 
is capped.   7
are three thresholds
12 which, if met, make the time to settlement in Regime HTC longer 
than in Regime NC. 
Our model also uncovers two important effects of caps on social welfare. First, it 
shows that the expected litigation expenses in Regime HTC may be larger than the 
expected litigation expenses in Regime NC. This follows from the fact that disputes in 
Regime HTC may take longer. A common complaint about the tort system is that it is 
inefficient: for every dollar of compensation paid by the defendant only 50 cents go to the 
plaintiff; the rest is lost as costs (See Avraham [2006b] pp 97). The model suggests that 
caps might not only fail to improve the efficiency of the system but in fact might make it 
worse.  
Second, the model predicts alterations in plaintiffs’ awards.  High type plaintiffs are 
always worse off in a caps regime, because they either recover less or recover later.  In 
contrast, the model shows that some low type plaintiffs may be either worse off or better 
off under a caps regime.  Specifically, some low type plaintiffs who used to mimic high 
type plaintiffs and consequently recover high type awards under Regime NC will only 
recover the cap under Regimes LTC or HTC, and thus will be worse off.  But some other 
low types (potentially plaintiffs with frivolous lawsuits)
13 who were sorted into the 
separating equilibria under Regime NC will fall into the pooling equilibria under 
Regimes LTC or HTC, thus obtaining a higher award. 
We therefore conclude that without tailoring caps to the economic and constitutional 
environment in the state, state legislators may find that enacted caps might decrease 
welfare by increasing overall litigation costs and the time to resolving the disputes, by 
under-compensating the severely injured victims or by over-compensating frivolous 
plaintiffs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature. In 
Section 3 we present the model. In Section 4 we show our main theoretical results. In 
Section 5 we conclude. 
                                                 
12 Cost is below a certain threshold, discount factor and probability of strike down are above other 
thresholds. 
13 That plaintiffs with small claims, even plaintiffs with negative expected value, can extract settlements 
was first observed by Bebchuk (1988) and was widely discussed in the literature,   8
2.  Bargaining Models and Tort Reform- Literature Review 
Our paper engages two strands of literature: the literature on bargaining models and 
the literature on the impact of tort reform. 
  There is a great deal of theoretical literature on bargaining models of dispute 
resolution examining why and when parties litigate instead of settle. (See, e.g., the 
surveys by Daughety [2000] and Spier [2005]). Parties may delay or even forgo 
settlement, even if symmetrically informed, when the relative structure of their litigation 
costs makes holding out for trial attractive, such as in Spier (2005) where costs are 
“lumpy”. Parties may also forgo settlement when they do not share a common prior belief 
as to the likely outcome of a trial. (e.g. Landes [1971], Posner [1973] or Priest and Klein 
[1984]). Furthermore, one-sided, asymmetric information regarding a defendant’s 
liability or plaintiff’s harm may increase the likelihood of a trial. (See, e.g., Bebchuk 
[1984], Nalebuff [1987], Reinganum and Wilde [1986], Spier [1992] or Sieg [2000]). The 
same result may occur when there exists two-sided asymmetric information—that is, both 
parties have information regarding their liability or harm that their adversary does not 
possess. (see e.g. Schweizer [1989], or Daughety and Reinganum [1994]). None of these 
models, however, takes into account the existence of caps, their size, or their 
constitutionality.  
Despite the attention tort reform, attracts there are only couple of law and economics 
models of it. Those that exist usually deal with the impact of tort reform on plaintiffs’ 
recoveries or on physicians’ initial behavior (Currie and McLeod [2008], Watanabe 
[2006]). There also are few empirical studies that explore the impact of tort reform on 
time to settlement. Babcock and Pogarsky (1999) conducted laboratory experiments 
demonstrating that caps on jury awards encourage settlement.  Kessler (1996) explored 
the causes of delay in settling automobile accident disputes. He found that reform 
imposing prejudgment interest, originally designed to reduce delay, in fact increases the 
time to settlement. Recently, Watanabe (2006), using a structural model approach, found 
that capping jury awards or eliminating the contingency fee rule significantly shortens the 
expected time to resolution and lowers the expected total legal costs. Overall, however, 
there is only little academic consensus about the actual impact of tort reform on various 
litigation outcomes such as average awards, frequency of litigation and total payments.   9
(see surveys by Danzon [2000] or Kessler and Rubinfeld [2004]). Again, none of these 
studies takes into account the possibility that the tort reform will be struck down or the 
impact of the size of the caps on dispute resolution times or recoveries. 
3.  The Model 
A risk neutral victim (Plaintiff) has a valid claim of x dollars of non-economic 
harm against a risk neutral negligent wrongdoer (Defendant).
14  While the liability of the 
wrongdoer is not disputed, there is uncertainty about the amount of the victim’s harm. 
There are two possible types of victims: (1) A victim with high non-economic harm, xH; 
and (2) a victim with low non-economic harm, xL, where xH > xL.  In either case, the 
defendant cannot observe the plaintiff’s actual non-economic harm, x, instead he can only 
estimate (perhaps based on the observable economic harm) the probability, π, that the 
plaintiff is a low harm type victim. We assume that π is drawn from a probability 
distribution with density f(π).
15 
In order to capture the possibility of acceleration or delay in the resolution of the 
conflict between the parties, we map the negotiation process over two rounds, each 
divided into a period of settlement and a period of trial, overall four periods. In the first 
period the defendant makes a settlement offer (S1) that the plaintiff can either accept or 
reject. If the plaintiff accepts S1, the game ends there.  If the plaintiff rejects it, the parties 
move to the second period.  In the second period the plaintiff either goes to court which 
would award damages (xH or xL) based on the victim's type,
16 or will wait for a new 
settlement offer in next round of negotiation. In the second round of negotiation (the third 
period) the defendant makes a new settlement offer (S3) that the plaintiff, again, can 
                                                 
14 In a more general formulation, Plaintiff’s claim X = xo + xi has two components: an observable 
component, xo, which represents the economic harm, such as medical bills, loss of income, etc, and an 
idiosyncratic unobservable component, xi  which represents the non-economic harm such as pain and 
suffering, mental anguish, etc. For simplicity we normalize the observable components, xo, to equal zero 
and focus on the idiosyncratic component, xi that we denote x. 
 
15 The probability distribution is not relevant for the characterization of the game played by plaintiff and 
defendant, but it will be relevant in Section 4 when we compare properties of regimes with and without 
caps. 
16 The fact that courts can correctly observe plaintiff’s true harm is not a strong assumption because it is 
equivalent to assuming that courts are not systematically biased and get it right, on average. Indeed, this is 
the same assumption used by Spier (1992) and Watanabe (2006).    10
either accept or reject. If the plaintiff accepts S3, the game ends there. If the plaintiff 
rejects it the parties move to the fourth period. In the fourth period the parties go to court 
with certainty, and the court would award xH or xL according to the victim’s damages. 
The timing of actions is the following: 
 
At t = 1 the defendant makes settlement offer (S1) 
  If the plaintiff accepts the offer the dispute ends there 
  If the plaintiff rejects the offer the parties move to the second period 
At t = 2 the plaintiff decides whether to go to court 
If the plaintiff decides to go to court the dispute is resolved there 
If the plaintiff decides not to go to court the parties move to the third 
period 
  At t = 3 the defendant makes settlement offer (S3) 
    If the plaintiff accepts the offer the dispute ends there 
    If the plaintiff rejects the offer the parties move to the fourth period  
At t = 4 the parties go to court with certainty and the dispute is resolved there 
 
Settlement negotiations and litigation are costly to both parties. Following other 
studies, (e.g. Spier, 1992) we normalize the plaintiff’s costs to be zero.
17  Hence, we 
assume that the defendant faces a fixed cost c for each settlement offer associated with 
the pretrial negotiation (for example, if the plaintiff accepts S1 the defendant incurs c, but 
if the plaintiff rejects S1, waits for a new offer at the third period (S3) and accepts it, the 
defendant incurs 2c in nominal terms).  In addition, we assume that the defendant incurs a 
fixed cost k if the case goes to court (either in period 2 or period 4) with k > c, and the 
parties have the same discount factor which we denote δ.
  
We compare the negotiation behavior and recoveries of the low type plaintiff and 
the high type plaintiff in a regime with and without caps on non-economic damages. As 
its name suggests it, a cap on non-economic damages establishes the maximum amount 
that can be recovered by plaintiffs in courts for their non economic harm. We denote it 
                                                 
17 This usual practice does not affect the generality of the results because, as will be seen in the derivation 
of the game’s equilibriums, what matters is the difference in the litigation costs faced by the parties.   11
x
c∈[xL,xH]. Note that the cap is binding in courts only and does not impose any direct 
limit on the settlement amount. 
As was explained in the introduction, caps are routinely struck down by state 
supreme courts.  From this, it follows that rational agents develop expectations that a 
strike down may take place—not necessarily in their case—sometime prior to the 
resolution of their case. In reality, these expectations may even change with time. For 
simplicity, we assume that both parties share the belief that the cap may get struck down 
with probability α and that the uncertainty is resolved once and for all at t = 4.
18 Notice 
that at the beginning of t = 4 there still is uncertainty about the amount that will be 
recovered but before the trial court makes a decision, the uncertainty is resolved by a 
ruling or by inaction by the state’s high court.
19 Diagram 1 presents the time line in the 
fourth period. 
 
[Diagram 1 here] 
 
Lastly, we define 
c
H x x x ) 1 ( α α − + =  as the expected payment obtained by a high 
type plaintiff if she goes to trial in the fourth period when caps are in place: If the caps 
are struck down, the high type plaintiff receives her true valuation, xH, whereas if the caps 
are upheld she gets the cap,
c x .  
 
 
                                                 
18 The assumption that both sides have the same beliefs about the probability of a strike down describes 
reality more accurately as we do not think that, in general, is true that one side has more (or less) 
information related to the “political desires to eliminate caps” than the other side. The assumptions that 
beliefs do not evolve through time and are not endogenously determined allow us to measure a first order 
magnitude of the impact of expectations over the behavior of agents. A rational expectations equilibrium 
approach would require an extensive description of the role of judges with a consequent deviation in the 
focus of the paper.   
19 As was mentioned in footnote 6, a special law firm called The Center for Constitutional Litigation, PC 
routinely challenges tort reforms in states and federal courts. For example, on November 2007 the law firm 
convinced a trial court in Illinois to strike down a medical malpractice reform enacted in August 2005. As 
of September 2008 the case is still pending at the Illinois Supreme Court. Lawyers in Illinois follow such 
cases closely and have been developing expectations regarding the probability of strike down at least from 
the moment the case was filed in the lower court on November 2006, a little over a year after the enactment 
of caps reform. See LeBron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, No. 06-L-12109. 
   12
3.1 Equilibria 
 
Complete proofs of the equilibria reached in the various regimes (with and 
without caps) are relegated to Appendix A. Here we summarize the most important 
characteristics and implications of the equilibria and the parties' strategic behaviors. 
Recall that we denote as Regime NC the equilibrium in which there are no caps. 
When caps are in place, we identify the existence of two types of equilibria. The first 
equilibrium takes place when the cap is high enough or the expectation of a strike down 
is low enough. In this equilibrium the present value of the expected payment obtained by 
a high type plaintiff is not significantly trimmed if she decides to settle immediately (first 
period) instead of waiting for a future resolution of the dispute (third or fourth period). 
We denote this equilibrium as a regime with caps and low expected trim (Regime LTC). 
The second equilibrium takes place when the cap is low enough or the expectation 
of a strike down is high enough. In this equilibrium the present value of the expected 
payment obtained by a high type plaintiff is significantly trimmed if she decides to settle 
immediately instead of waiting for a future resolution of the dispute. We denote that 
equilibrium as a regime with caps and high expected trim (Regime HTC).
20  
 
REMARK While the model provides a simple way to classify states as Regimes LTC or 
HTC , as an empirical matter it is not as easy to find proxies for the probability of a strike 
down, α , and for a high-type claim,  H x  . However, by using the political composition of 
the states’ Supreme Courts as a proxy for α  (under the assumption that liberal courts are 
more likely to strike down the reform) and the distribution of awards in a state as the 
basis for estimating  H x   Avraham and Bustos (2008) suggest that, for example, Maine is 
a state with Regime HTC and North Dakota is a state with Regime LTC.  
 
A common property in the solutions for every type of regime (NC, LTC and 
HTC) is that there exists a cutoff probability that the plaintiff is a low type victim such 
that for any probability,π , smaller than this cutoff value, the solution defines a pooling 
                                                 
20 Obviously, some high (low) trims of the recoveries may take place in Regime LTC (HTC) as the 
equilibria refer to the average value of trims.   13
equilibrium where the defendant ends up paying the same amount of money to both types 
of plaintiffs.  For any probability higher than this cutoff, the solution defines a separating 
equilibrium where, in general, the defendant ends up paying different amounts of money 
to the high and the low type victims.
21 As will be explained in more detail below, there 
are different cut-off probabilities for the no-caps regime (
NC π ), for the regime with caps 
and high expected trim (
HTC π ), and for the regime with caps and low expected trim 
(
LTC π ). Figure 1 summarizes the most important characteristics of the solutions for the 
regimes with and without caps which we start detailing next.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
A Regime With No Caps (Regime NC)- When the parties face no caps, there exists a 
unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. When there is a low probability that the defendant 
faces a low type victim, i.e. when
NC π π < , the defendant’s offer is  H x δ  and both types of 
plaintiffs accept it.  In that pooling equilibrium the low type plaintiff benefits from 
defendant’s unwillingness to offer L x δ .
22
  Conversely, when there is a high probability that 
the defendant faces a low type victim, i.e. when
NC π π > , the defendant offers L x δ .  In that 
separating equilibrium, the low type settles immediately, because waiting will not yield 
her a higher recovery, whereas the high type will settle in the second period of the first 
round of negotiation (litigation), because that will yield her a recovery of H x δ > L x δ .   
 
A Regime With Caps- When the parties face caps there still exists a unique perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium, but there are two important differences from Regime NC. First, 
when caps are in place the maximum that any plaintiff can recover is not δxH but δx
c.  
Second, the incentives of the parties to wait for future periods are changed so that parties 
                                                 
21 We will see that in some cases of separating equilibrium both types end up recovering the same. 
Nevertheless, in those cases, the properties of the solution differ from the properties of a pooling 
equilibrium. 
22 The defendant does not want to incur a second round of negotiations costs, c, and possibly legal costs, k, 
if the case goes to trial because there are not enough low type victims for the defendant to benefit from 
separating them out.   14
may end up resolving their disputes in the second round of negotiation (i.e. in third or 
fourth period). 
In order to distinguish between the high and low expected trim equilibria we 
define the expected trim in recovery as
c c
H x x x / ) ( − α . This expression captures the 
expected nominal disutility (disutility when 1 = δ ) that the high type plaintiff suffers if 
she settles in the first period for
c x  instead of in the third period for the expected value 
of
c
H x x ) ( α α − + 1 . Note that we are not claiming that all the settlements will be equal to 
c x .  As we will see later, there are cases (depending on the value of π) in which the 
parties settle for more or less than
c x . 
The higher the caps are, or the lower the expectation for a strike down is, the more 
willing is a plaintiff to settle in the first period. The reason is that a plaintiff expects a 
small trim by settling in the first period because either the caps are high (so settling now 
for 
c x does not entail a large loss) or the expectation for a strike down is low (so there is 
not much gained from waiting to the next period). 
Appendix A shows that different equilibria take place depending on whether 
c c
H x x x / ) ( − α  is larger or smaller than the cutoff 
2 2 1 δ δ / ) ( −  (or equivalently, if x
c 
is larger or smaller than x
2 δ ).  If 
c c
H x x x / ) ( − α <
2 2 1 δ δ / ) ( −  we are in Regime 
LTC.  If 
c c
H x x x / ) ( − α > 
2 2 1 δ δ / ) ( −  we are in Regime HTC.
23  Figure 2 shows the 
set of equilibria for Regimes LTC and HTC in the space (α, x
c). Notice how the 
separation of cases depends on both parameters. For example, when α = 1, which means 
that the probability of a strike down is 1, there exists a cut-off value  H x
2 δ  such that for 
values of the cap smaller than that cut-off we are in Regime HTC, but for values larger 
than that cut-off we are in Regime LTC. Also observe that the lower the discount factor is 
the less attractive it is for the plaintiff to delay the resolution of the dispute and 
consequently the more likely it is that we are in Regime LTC.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
                                                 
23 We do not consider the case: 
c x c x H x / ) ( − α =  2 2 1 δ δ / ) ( −  because it does not add to the main 
discussion. The equilibrium strategies are a mix of the strategies that define the LTC and HTC solutions.   15
 
A Regime With Caps and Low Trim (Regime LTC)- When x
c > x
2 δ ,  the 
results that we obtained in the regime without caps are replicated here only in that x
c 
replaces xH.  Specifically, when there is a low probability that the defendant faces a low 
type victim, i.e. when
LTC π π < , there is a pooling equilibrium in which both types of 
victims receive
c x δ  in the first period.  Otherwise, when there is a high probability that 
the defendant faces a low type victim, i.e. when
LTC π π > , there is a separating 
equilibrium where the low type victim receives  L x δ  and the high type victim receives
c x δ .  
Like in the case of no caps, the low type recovers in the first period and the high type in 
the second period, both in the first round of negotiation. The reason the high type is not 
willing to wait for a third period is simple: The probability of a strike down is not large 
enough, and/or the caps are large enough relative to her true harm, so the plaintiff does 
not expect to gain much from waiting.   
 
A Regime With Caps and High Expected Trim (Regime HTC)- When x
c < x
2 δ   
the analysis becomes more nuanced.  As in regimes NC and LTC, it is still true that when 
there is a low probability that the defendant faces a low type victim (i.e. when π <
HTC π ), 
there is a pooling equilibrium in which both types of victims receive  x
3 δ  in the first 
period.
  However, when there is a high probability that the defendant faces a low type 
victim (i.e. when π > 
HTC π ), things change in two ways compared to the other regimes.  
First, the high type victim always waits for the second round (third period) settlement 
offer (S3).  The reason is that when the defendant offers  L x δ  in the first period, the 
plaintiff can only recover 
c x δ  in the second period and both expressions are smaller than 
x
3 δ  which is what the high type plaintiff expects to recover in the third period.  To see 
that indeed  x S
3
3 δ = , notice that the defendant mixes between two offers: with 
probability  ) ( / ) ( L L
D x x x x p − − =
2 2 δ δ  he offers δxL in which case the high type plaintiff 
goes to court and recovers an expected value of  x δ ,
24 or, alternatively, with 
                                                 
24 The offer δxL is an option given that the defendant knows that the low type may have mimicked the high 
type.   16
probability
D p − 1  he offers  x δ  in which case the high type plaintiff accepts it. Second, 
the low type plaintiff may not only decide to wait in the first period, but also in the 
second period (the idea is to mimic the high type’s decision).  The low type settles in the 
first period for  L x δ  with probability  )) ( /( ) ( L
LP x x k p − − − = − π π 1 1 1  or settles in the 
third period for (S3) with probability .
LP p
25  In order to support the mixed strategies 
equilibrium the expected (and discounted) value of the recovery in the third period is L x δ . 
 
3.2 Preliminary Considerations about the Equilibria 
 
It is straightforward to show that there are more pooling equilibria under Regime 
LTC than under Regime NC. This is because the amount that the defendant needs to offer 
to induce plaintiff’s immediate acceptance is smaller under the regime with a cap than the 
regime without a cap (δx
c instead of δxH). In order to see that formally, note that the 
expressions determining 
NC π  and 
LTC π  are:  
 





NC + = + − + − + δ δ π δ π δ π ) 1 ( ) 1 (    (1) 
 
and 
c c x c k c x x
LTC LTC
L
LTC + = + − + − + δ δ π δ π δ π ) 1 ( ) 1 (     (2) 
 
respectively. The expressions identify the π s that make the defendant indifferent 
between pooling and separating equilibrium. The right hand side of (1) and (2) 
corresponds to the cost faced by the defendant in a pooling equilibrium (single settlement 
payment plus negotiation cost, c) while the left hand side corresponds to the cost faced by 
                                                 
25 As usual in these cases, there is no equilibrium in which the low type plaintiff plays a pure strategy 
because if her strategy is always to wait she recovers only L x δ . In this case the defendant induces the high 
type to settle in the first period by offering her x
3 δ and has certainty that in the second period he is facing 
the low type. But then the low type has no incentives to wait, hence the strategy cannot be an equilibrium. 
In the same way, if her strategy is never to wait she recovers only L x δ  because the defendant will not offer 
her  x
3 δ .  Again, there are incentives to deviate.   17
the defendant in a separating equilibrium (settlement payment tailored to each type of 
plaintiff plus the cost of negotiation, c, plus the cost of trial if plaintiff is the high type).  
As for a givenπ , the separating equilibrium is more attractive than the pooling 
equilibrium by  k x x L H δ π πδ ) ( ) ( − − − 1  under Regime NC (we subtract the left hand 
side from the right hand side of (1)) but only by  k x x L
c δ π πδ ) ( ) ( − − − 1  under Regime 
LTC (the same but for (2)). 
26  It follows that the set of values of π for which the pooling 
equilibrium dominates the separating equilibrium is larger under regime LTC than it is 
under Regime NC (i.e., 
NC π  < 
LTC π ).        
The comparison between the set of equilibria generated under Regime HTC and 
the set of equilibria generated under the other two regimens requires more elaboration. 
First, note that the identity that determines the value of 
HTC π  is  
 









− + − +
3 2 3
1
1 1 δ δ
π
δ
δ π δ π πδ




L x x k k − + = π . Again, (3) establishes the point of indifference for the 
defendant between pooling and separating equilibrium. If we compare (3) with (1) and 
(2), we realize that not only the expected recovery of the high type victim has changed, 
now it is x
3 δ  instead of H x δ or
c x δ , but also the expected litigation costs faced by the 
defendant when he offers L x S δ = 1 . In regimes NC and LTC the expected overall legal  
expenses were  c k + − δ π ) (1  whereas now, under Regime HTC, they 
are c k p












* ) ( . The first expression in the square bracket represents 
the defendant’s negotiation costs in the third period. The second expression in the square 
bracket represents the litigation costs that might take place in the fourth period. 
 
                                                 
26 These are values of π  larger than  ) /( k x x k L H
NC + − = π  for Regime NC and larger than 
) /( k x x k L
c LTC + − = π  for Regime LTC.   18
REMARK Notice that the negotiation costs are always larger under Regime HTC than 
under Regimes NC or LTC as c c
c









δ π . In addition, as 1
2 < δ
D p , the 
litigation costs in Regime HTC are always smaller than in Regimes NC or LTC. As we 
will explain with more detail later, the higher negotiation costs in Regime HTC is what 
causes this regime to be sometimes more costly than Regime NC.    
 
The former analysis allows us to derive a number of properties. First, 
HTC π  is 
increasing with c because the higher the litigation expenses are the less attractive it is for 
the defendant to offer δxL (that offer may induce the plaintiff to wait and thus generate an 
extra round of negotiations).  Second, 
HTC π  is decreasing with δ and α because the 
smaller  x
3 δ  is the more attractive it is for the defendant to make the offer that induces 
the pooling equilibrium.
27  Third, from inspection of (3), we realize that if c = 0 and δ = α 
= 1 then
NC HTC π π = .  
Taken together, these properties imply that there are more pooling equilibria 
under Regime HTC than under Regime NC (
NC π  does not depend on c, δ or α). In 
addition, if the settlement costs, c, are large enough there are more pooling equilibria 
under Regime HTC than under Regime LTC (i.e. 
HTC π >
LTC π ). But if the settlement 
costs, c, are small enough the opposite is true (i.e. 
HTC π <
LTC π ). We summarize the 
former analysis in the next two Lemmas. 
 
Lemma 1:  
HTC π  is strictly increasing in c but strictly decreasing in δ and α. 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
Lemma 2:  
a)  For all values of c, δ and α, 
LTC NC π π <  and 
HTC NC π π <  
                                                 
27 At first, this looks counterintuitive as the larger δ or α are, the more the defendant expects to pay in 
litigation expenses if the plaintiff decides to wait. Nevertheless, δ and α also determine how much the 
defendant pays the plaintiff if the dispute is resolved in the first period ( x
3 δ  ), and this last effect 
dominates the first one.  See the proof of proposition 1 in Appendix B for more details.   19
b)  For all values of δ and α, 
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4.  Results  
 
4.1  Do Caps Accelerate or Delay Settlement? 
 
  We start by asking whether caps reduce the time required by the parties to solve 
their disputes after we account for the parties’ knowledge that the caps may get struck 
down some time after they are enacted.  In this Section we show that: 1) the expected 
length of disputes in LTC states is shorter than equivalent disputes in states without caps; 
2) the expected length of disputes in HTC states may be longer than equivalent disputes 
litigated in states without caps.  This last possibility is realized when settlement costs, c, 
are low and expected recoveries, x
3 δ , are  high.  
  To start, note that, from the perspective of the social planner who knows that π is 
drawn from the distribution f(π), the expected lengths of resolution of disputes (number 
of periods) for regimes NC and LTC are given by  
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respectively. Both expressions tell us that plaintiffs resolve the dispute in at most two 
periods.  For π smaller than the cutoff, all plaintiffs accept the defendant’s first period 
settlement offer.  For π larger than the cutoff, low type plaintiffs resolve the dispute in 
one period while high types proceed to the second period—litigation.  By inspection, we 
notice that (4) and (5) are dissimilar only in the limits of the integrals (the cutoffs).  As 
we know that
NC LTC π π > , it is straightforward to conclude that disputes under Regime 
LTC are resolved more quickly than are disputes under Regime NC, because equation 5 
(Regime LTC) has one fewer term than does equation 4 (Regime NC) (corresponding to 
the high type plaintiffs who solve the dispute in one period under Regime LTC as 
opposed to two periods under Regime NC).  This is valid for all possible belief 
distributions, f(π), about the type of plaintiff. 
We proceed in the same way to compare the length of dispute resolution under 
Regime NC and HTC.  First, we write the expression for the length of dispute resolution 
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The expression tells us that while in a pooling equilibrium (π  smaller than the 
cutoff) all the plaintiffs solve the dispute in one period, in a separating equilibrium (π  
larger than the cutoff) the low type plaintiffs settle their dispute in one period with 
probability 
LP p − 1  but in three periods with probability 
LP p , and high types either settle 
in period 3 with probability 
D p − 1  or go to trial in period 4 with probability
D p .  
Then, if we rewrite (4) as 
), (4'                ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1  
1
∫ ∫ − + − + =
HTC
HTC





we notice that there are two dissimilarities between  ) ' 4 (  and (6) which push the length of 
resolution of disputes in different directions.  First, the difference in the limit of the   21
integral tells us that all the high type plaintiffs with  [ ]
HTC NC π π π , ∈  who used to go to trial 
under Regime NC in the second period, under Regime HTC settle in the first period with 
certainty.
28  That first effect reduces the length of resolution of disputes under Regime 
HTC.  Second, the difference in the argument of the integral tells us that the low type 
plaintiffs with 
HTC π π ≥  may take longer than one period to solve their dispute while high 
type plaintiffs with
HTC π π ≥  resolve their disputes in the third or fourth and not in the 
second period as was the case in Regime NC and is seen in  ) ' 4 ( .  That second effect 
increases the length dispute resolution under Regime HTC.  In Appendix B we show that 
the second effect dominates the first and thus the resolution length in Regime HTC is 
longer than that in Regime NC under certain conditions:  (1)  The discount factor, δ , and 
the expectation of a strike down,α , are not too low, and (2)  the cost of negotiation is not 
too high.  The result is valid regardless of the values of the recoveries, the cap, and the 
distribution of beliefs about plaintiff’s type.  
The reason the results are conditional on the values of c, δ and α is as follows:  If 
the costs of negotiation, c, are not very high the defendant is more inclined to make an 
offer that will induce the plaintiff to wait for a second round, because that extra round of 
negotiations is not too expensive. On the other side, if the discount factor and the 
expectation of a strike down, δ and α respectively, are large, the defendant is more 
inclined to make an offer that will induce the plaintiff to wait for a second round, because 
the offer that the plaintiff demands for not waiting,  x
3 δ  , becomes larger. 
The following proposition summarizes the analysis above. 
 
Proposition 1: (Time of dispute resolution) 
a)  Expected dispute resolution is shorter in Regime LTC than in Regime NC. 
b)   There exists  ) , , ( δ α c such that for all  ) , , ( δ α c  satisfying  δ δ α α > > <    and       , c c  
the expected time of dispute resolution is longer in Regime HTC than in Regime NC. 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
                                                 
28 There are no differences for the low type plaintiffs.   22
REMARK As was mentioned in footnote 10 above Avraham and Bustos (2008) show 
some preliminary empirical evidence that supports the veracity of Proposition 1.  
 
4.2 Welfare Implications 
 
In this Section we consider the welfare implications of our model.  We ask 
questions such as whether caps increase total legal costs, or cause plaintiffs to recover 
more or less.  In order to answer these questions, we start by noticing that caps 
(regardless of the size of the expected trim) tend to increase the percentage of disputes 
that are settled rather than litigated. Later, we show that, relative to Regime NC, Regime 
LTC tends to reduce litigation expenses while Regime HTC tends to increase them. 
Finally, we show that in both Regime LTC and HTC, plaintiffs with high value claims 
typically end worse off while plaintiffs with low value claims may end better or worse off 
compared to similar plaintiffs in Regime NC.  
 
4.2.1  Proportion of Disputes Settled 
 
As shown above, it is commonly thought that caps will increase the fraction of 
disputes that are settled instead of litigated. Because the expected recovery in a trial is 
smaller, the parties would prefer to settle and save the cost of trials more frequently. Our 
model offers a slightly different reason why caps increase the fraction of disputes settled. 
In our model, caps drive defendants to make high offers (offers that induce both types of 
plaintiffs to settle in the first period) more frequently than in the no-caps case because 
those “high offers” required to induce pooling equilibria are lower when caps are in 
place.
29  
More formally, under Regime NC, trials take place only for 
NC π π >  and a high 
type plaintiff.  Under Regime LTC, trials take place only for 
LTC π π >  and a high type 
plaintiff.  Because
NC LTC π π > , it is clear that the set of pairs of defendants and plaintiffs 
                                                 
29 In addition, in Regime HTC the high type plaintiff may decide to settle in the third period whereas in 
Regime NC, if the high type does not settle in the first period she would go to trial in the second period. 
   23
that resolve their disputes through settlement is higher in the regime with caps and low 
trim than in the no-caps regime. Analogously, under Regime HTC trials take place with 
probability
D p only for 
HTC π π >  and a high type plaintiff.  Because
NC HTC π π > , it is 
clear that the set of pairs of defendants and plaintiffs that resolve their disputes through 
settlement is higher in the regime with caps and high trim than in the no-caps regime. 
 
4.2.2  Do Caps Increase or Decrease Litigation Expenses? 
 
Given that disputes are solved more quickly and are more likely to be settled than 
litigated under Regime LTC than under Regime NC, it is not surprising that litigation 
expenses (costs of negotiation and trial) are lower under Regime LTC. However, the 
same does not hold for the comparison between regimes NC and HTC. Proposition 1 
proved that regime HTC may have longer times of resolution of disputes than regime NC, 
ergo we may expect that litigation expenses will increase as well. Although we will find 
that indeed that is the case, we show that a longer time of resolution of disputes is not 
enough to conclude that legal costs are larger. For example, if the reduction in the 
proportion of trials that take place in the second round is large enough to dominate the 
increment in the negotiation costs (both characteristics of the HTC solution) then, the 
total legal costs will be smaller.   
 
To proceed we first write the expressions for the expected costs of litigation in 
regimes NC and HTC respectively  









π δ δ             (7)                   
( ) dx x f k p c x c xp c E
HTC
D LP HTC ) ( } ) ( { ∫ + − + + =
1 3 2 2 1
π δ δ δ     (8) 
 
There are three main dissimilarities between (7) and (8). First, disputes are settled 
instead of litigated in a higher proportion in Regime HTC than in Regime NC.  This 
“settlement effect” is captured by the expression dx x f k x
HTC
NC ) ( ) ( ∫ −
π
π δ 1  , which appears in 
(7) but not in (8) and represents the extra costs of litigation for Regime NC. Second, trials   24
under Regime HTC take place at the fourth instead of the second period. This implies that 
the trial costs are lower under Regime HTC.  This “trial effect” is captured by the 
difference between  k p x
D 3 ) 1 ( δ −  in (8) and  k x δ ) ( − 1  in (7) ( k p x
D 3 ) 1 ( δ − < k x δ ) ( − 1 ). 
Third, disputes may be resolved over longer periods of time, which implies additional 
costs of negotiation under Regime HTC. This “length effect” is captured by the 
expression c x c xp
LP 2 2 1 δ δ ) ( − + , which is in (8) but not in (7). 
While the first two effects (the “settlement effect” and the “trial effect”) tend to 
decrease litigation expenses under Regime HTC relative to Regime NC, the third effect 
(the “length effect”) tends to increase them. As a result, caps may actually increase rather 
than reduce litigation expenses. 
Proposition 1 offers the starting point for determining when the “length effect” 
will dominate the “settlement” and “trial” effects.  If c = 0, δ =1 and α =1, then total legal 
expenses are equal under both regimes. The reason is that the “length effect” disappears 
when c = 0, the “trial effect” disappears when δ = 1 and the “settlement effect” disappears 
when in addition to c = 0 and δ =1 it is also true that α =1.
30 Once one realizes that 
HTC E  
is a concave function on the value of c
31, and is a strictly increasing function of δ and α, 
but that those same parameters do not affect
NC E , one can conclude that Regime HTC 
generates more litigation expenses than Regime NC if the negotiation costs are small 
enough and/or the discount factor together with the expectations of a strike down are 
large enough. 
 
The following proposition summarizes the analysis above. 
Proposition 2: (Litigation expenses) 
a)   Expected litigation expenses are smaller in Regime LTC than in Regime NC. 
 
                                                 
30 The recovery of the high type plaintiff is xH regardless of the value of the cap because the cap will be 
struck down for sure. As we mentioned before, when the parameters take these particular values we have 
that  ) /( k x x k L H
HTC NC + − = =π π . 
31 It increases for small values of c but decreases for large values of c   25
b)  There exists ) , , (
* * * δ α c such that for all  ) , , ( δ α c satisfying 
* * * , δ δ α α > > <    and      c c  
the expected litigation expenses are larger in Regime HTC than in Regime NC. 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
A comparison of  ) , , (
* * * δ α c  from Proposition 2 with  ) , , ( δ α c  from Proposition 
1 shows that because 
NC HTC L c L > = = = ) , , ( 1 1 0 α δ but 
NC HTC E c E = = = = ) 1 , 1 , 0 ( α δ  
then 
* * * , δ δ α α < < >   and     c c . That means that for all cases in which  [ ] c c c ,
* ∈  the 
expected time of resolution of disputes (all else being equal) is longer in Regime HTC 
than in Regime NC but the litigation expenses are not increased. The same holds for all 
cases in which  [ ]
* ,α α α ∈  and/or [ ]
* ,δ δ δ ∈ . This shows that the longer time of resolution 
of disputes in Regime HTC than in Regime NC does not necessarily imply that the legal 
costs are larger. 
 
We acknowledge that Proposition 2 only takes into account short-term effects. That is, 
the additional litigation costs incur within the time period in which the uncertainty 
surrounding the cap is unresolved.
32 This means that even if HTC induces short term 
increments in litigation expenses, those increments may be offset by long term reductions 
in expenses (in the future after the uncertainty is resolved and the HTC regime becomes 
either LTC or NC permanently). Accordingly, society might not lose by enacting caps. 
While this observation is correct, one has to remember that as a matter of fact, the 
average time to resolving the uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of caps in the 
U.S. is about 10 years (See Avraham [2006]). Moreover, as it is stated in the next lemma 
and proved in appendix B, even when we take into account long-term effects, part (b) of 
Proposition 2 still holds.  
 
Lemma 3: If there is an infinite sequence of pairs of plaintiffs and defendants such that 
the uncertainty about the cap is resolved in the game played by the first pair then there 
                                                 
32 We thank Tom Kelly for pointing this out to us.    26
exists ) , , (
* * * δ α c such that for all  ) , , ( δ α c satisfying 
* * * , δ δ α α > > <    and      c c  the 
expected time of dispute resolution is longer in a Regime HTC than in a Regime NC. 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
Evidently, the parameters in Lemma 3 relative to Proposition 2 are more stringent. 
That is,  ) , (
* * δ α  which are defined by Lemma 3 are larger than the equivalent values 
which were defined by Proposition 2,  and  ) (
* c  which was defined by Lemma 3 is 
smaller than the equivalent value which was defined by Proposition 2. This is because 
after a period in which society experiences a welfare loss due to uncertainty in the 
constitutionality of the caps (increase in litigation expenses), there is a period in which it 
experiences a gain due to the elimination of that uncertainty (decrease in litigation 
expenses). Lemma 3 shows that there always exist cases in which the aggregate effect is 
negative. 
 
4.2.3  Do Caps Increase or Decrease Plaintiffs’ Recoveries? 
 
At this point we wonder whether caps have any systematic effects on the 
recoveries obtained by plaintiffs. One may expect that plaintiffs should be able to recover 
less in states with caps. Indeed, that is the overall effect. Nevertheless, when we 
distinguish by the type of the plaintiff, we uncover an unexpected result.  Unlike high 
type plaintiffs, who always recover less when caps are in place, low type plaintiffs may 
recover the same, more, or less when caps are in place, depending on various factors.   
  Some low type plaintiffs may recover less because high type plaintiffs also 
recover less. Recall that in a pooling equilibrium low type plaintiffs recover the same 
dollar amount as high type plaintiffs. Hence, low type plaintiffs who would have been 
pooled with high type plaintiffs in any case will recover in any of the caps regimes less 
than they would in Regime NC. 
Some low type plaintiffs may recover more because some low type plaintiffs are 
included in pooling equilibria under the caps regimes (low types recover
c x δ in LTC 
and x
3 δ  in HTC in the case of pooling equilibria), rather than falling under the separating   27
equilibria as they would under the no caps regime (where low types recover only L x δ ).  
We know this effect exists because the cut-off that divides pooling from separating 
equilibrium is larger under the cap regimes than the no cap regime. More formally 
 
Proposition 3:  (Recoveries) 
a)  For all values of π , high type victims receive lower recoveries in regimes with 
caps (whether LTC or HTC) than in a regime without caps. 
b)  For all values of
NC π π < , low type victims receive smaller recoveries in regimes 
with caps (whether LTC or HTC) than in a regime without caps.  For all values of 
[ ] ) , max( ,
HTC LTC NC π π π π ∈  low type victims receive larger or equal (expected) recoveries 
in regimes with caps (whether LTC or HTC) than in a regime without caps. For all values 
of ) , max(
HTC LTC π π π >  low type victims receive equal (expected) recoveries in regimes 
with caps (whether LTC or HTC) and without caps.  
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
REMARK.  That high-type plaintiffs would be under-compensated if subjected to caps 
was observed by many. For example Viscusi (1991) pp 97 argued that the effect of caps is that 
“victims with major injuries would be limited in making their claims while those with minor 
injuries would be unaffected.” As a result victims of brain damage, para- or quadriplegia, and 
cancer will be the most disadvantaged. For these reasons, among others, a study by the 
American Legal Institute (ALI) rejected caps (See ALI [1991] pp 219-220). Our study is 
the first to formally show (in addition to the under-compensation of high-type plaintiffs) 
the possibility that caps will cause victims with minor injuries to be over-compensated, 
and not simply “unaffected”.   
 
4.3 Discussion: Which states should enact caps? 
 
Our analysis suggests that states’ legislators should be cautious when enacting caps 
because they might decrease total welfare by increasing litigation costs. To see that in 
more detail we go back to figure 2 and discuss the optimal decision of four hypothetical 
states denoted in the figure with the letters A, B, C and D.     28
To simplify the discussion we can assume that the discount factor δ is larger than δ
* 
and all the states face the same costs of negotiation c which are smaller than c
*. 
A state such as the one denoted A (which, for example, may correspond to Montana 
in Avraham and Bustos (2008)) which enacted a relatively small cap and faces a low 
probability that its Supreme Court would strike down the cap, will probably benefit from 
the enactment. The reason is that although the cap defines a high trim equilibrium the low 
value of α not only implies large “settlement” and “trial” effects but in addition a small 
“length” effect.
33 In other words, the reduction in trial costs generated by the cap is larger 
than the increase in negotiation costs also generated by the cap.
34  
A state such as B (which, for example, may correspond to Maine) which faces the 
same probability of a strike down as state A but enacted a middle level cap, benefits with 
certainty from the cap. The obvious reason is that parameters (α, x
c) define a low trim 
equilibrium.  
Interestingly, a state such as D (which, for example, may correspond to North 
Dakota) also benefits with certainty from the cap as the equilibrium is low trim. 
Nevertheless, because in the case of North Dakota there would be more separating 
equilibria than in the case of Maine,
35 more cases will be decided by a judge instead of 
settled and so litigation costs in North Dakota may be higher than in Maine.  This result is 
completely driven by the difference in the size of the cap; expectations regarding the 
strike down do not play any role. 
Finally, a state such as C (which, for example, may correspond to Illinois) is the only 
one in our hypothetical analysis which does not benefit from enacting a cap.  C has the 
same α as D and the same x
c as B, two states with low trim equilibrium, nevertheless, 
both parameters taken together, define a high trim equilibrium. One may wonder why D 
and A are so different:  Whereas in A, even when the equilibrium was also high trim we 
                                                 
33 From Lemma 1 we know that 
HTC π is decreasing in α which guarantees a high settlement effect. It is 
easy to show that 
D p is increasing with α which guarantees a high trial effect. Finally, it is also straight 
forward  to see that 
LP p is decreasing  in α which implies a low length effect. 
34 Strictly speaking, the result holds if and only if  .
* α α <  
35 Because 
LTC π decreases with x
c.   29
expected a social gain, in D we do not. The answer is that in D, α is large enough to 
guarantee that the increase in negotiation costs dominates the reduction in trial costs.
36 
5    Conclusions 
That parties delay settlements in the shadow of caps may seem counterintuitive. 
After all, caps reduce the uncertainty associated with jury awards, and are therefore 
expected to ease settlements. In contrast, we showed that if the parties expect that caps 
will be struck down in the near future, they might delay settlement. In Avraham and 
Bustos (2008) we test empirically some of our predictions and find supporting evidence. 
There we show that a) when the caps are relatively small and the probability of their 
strike down is large, parties delay settlements, until the fate of the caps becomes clear, 
and b) that when the caps are high and the probability of their strike down is small, 
parties will expedite their settlements, relative to states with no caps.  
From a welfare perspective, Proposition 2 is probably the most important 
theoretical finding of this paper: Low Expected Trim Caps decrease legal expenses 
whereas High Expected Trim Caps may increase them. While our model deals with the 
short run, the insight that there exists an ex-ante cutoff probability of a strike-down due to 
unconstitutionality of the caps, α , above which enacting caps will be welfare decreasing 
remains true even when the long run is considered. But that cutoff will naturally be 
higher the longer the time period considered.  An intuitive policy implication emerges 
from this analysis: States legislatures that believe the high court of their state is highly 
likely to strike down the reform, and care much about the short term effects of settlement 
delays, may be better off enacting relatively high caps or not enacting them at all. 
Our model suggests that caps hit plaintiffs with large claims the hardest because they 
either receive lower recoveries if the caps are struck down, or delayed settlements if the 
caps are not. Interestingly, the model predicts that, in some circumstances, High Expected 
Trim caps may make plaintiffs with small claims (perhaps plaintiffs with frivolous 
lawsuits) better off as it enables them to sometimes receive the same settlement offer that 
plaintiffs with high claims receive, which is higher than what they would get in regime 
                                                 
36 As in footnote 35, strictly speaking, the result holds if and only if  .
* α α >    30
with no caps. Since there are no nation-wide datasets which contain plaintiffs’ original 






ALI (1991) American Legal Institute, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: 
Approaches to Legal and Institutional Change, Volume II. 
Arlen Jennifer, Tort Damages: A Survey, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds., 2000). 
Atiyah, P.S. (1980). Accidents, Compensation and the Law. (3
rd Ed). 
 
Avraham, R. (2006a) Datbase on State Tort Law Reforms, available at ssrn.com 
 
Avraham, R. (2006b). “Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the 
Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change”, Northwestern Univ. Law 
Rev., 100, pp 87.-120. 
 
Avraham, R. (2007). “The Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice Settlement 
Payment” Journal of Legal Studies 36 (2), pp 183-229. 
 
Avraham, R. and A. Bustos (February 2008) “The Unexpected Effect of Tort Reform: Do 
Caps Accelerate Settlements?” (on file with authors). 
 
Babcock L and Pogarsky G. (1999) “Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral 
Approach”, Journal of Legal Studies, 28 341–70. 
 
Bebchuk, L. A. (1984) “Litigation and settlement under imperfect information”, RAND 
Journal of Economics, 15, pp 404-415. 
 
Bebchuk, L. A. (1988) “Suing solely to extract a settlement offer”, Journal of Legal 
Studies, 17, pp 437-449. 
 
Currie, J., and MacLeod W. Bentley (2008), “First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth 
Outcomes”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2008, pp 795-830. 
                                                 
37 In a previous study, Avraham (2007) showed that cases subject to caps on non-economic damages that 
were not struck down have lower average recoveries by 65 to 72 percent. (Yet, Avraham (2007) did not 
distinguish between high claims victims and low claims victims. In an empirical analysis (not reported 
here) we defined claims as being high or low based on the fields of the physicians. We found weak support 
for the model’s predictions. While we find that Low Expected Trim caps significantly reduce high-claim 
plaintiffs’ recoveries, we find that High Expected Trim Caps increased the recovery of victims with low 
claims by 10%, yet this increase was not found to be significant.     31
 
Danzon, P.M., (2000). “Liability for Malpractice,” In Anthony J. Culyer and Joseph P. 
Newhouse, eds., Handbook of Health Economics. New York: Elsevier. 
 
Daughety, A.F. (2000) ‘Settlement’, In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume 5. 
B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing Co. 
 
Daughety, A. F. and Reinganum, J.F. (1994) “Settlement negotiations with two-sided 
asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution and efficiency”, 
International Review of Law and Economics, 14, pp 283-298. 
 
Kessler, D.P. (1996). “Institutional Causes of Delay in the Settlement of Legal Disputes”, 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organizations, 12(2), pp 432-460. 
 
Kessler, D.P., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. (2004). ‘‘Empirical Study of the Civil Justice 
System.’’ NBER Working Paper 10825. 
 
Landes, W.M. (1971) “An economic analysis of the courts”, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 14, pp 61-107. 
 
Nalebuff, B. (1987) “Credible pretrial negotiation”, RAND Journal of Economics, 18, pp 
198-210. 
 
Parsons C. (2005) “Trial lawyers target cap on malpractice”, Chicago Tribune (Aug 25, 
2005).  
 
Posner, R.A. (1973) “An economic approach to legal procedure and judicial 
administration”, Journal of Legal Studies, 2, pp 399-458. 
 
Priest, G. and Klein, B. (1984), “The selection of disputes for litigation”, Journal of 
Legal Studies, 13, pp 1-55. 
 
Reinganum, J. and Wilde, L. (1986) “Settlement, litigation, and the allocation of 
litigation costs”, RAND Journal of Economics, 17, pp 557-68. 
 
Rubin, P. (1993). Tort Reform by Contract. Published by the American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research (Aei Pr), Washington DC. 
 
Schweizer, U. (1989) “Litigation and settlement under two sided incomplete 
information”, Review of Economic Studies, 56, pp 163-177. 
 
Sieg, H. (2000). “Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: 
Evidence from Medical Malpractice Disputes”, Journal of Political Economy, 108(5), pp. 
1006-1021. 
   32
Spier, K. (1992). “The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiations”, Review of Economic Studies, 
59 (1), pp 93-108. 
 
Spier, K. (2005). Litigation. The Handbook of Law and Economics. Chapter 4, Vol 1. 
 
Zukerman S., Koller C. and Bovbjerg R. (1986). “Information on Malpractice: A Review 
of Empirical Research on Major Policy Issues”, 49,  Law and Contemporary Problems, 
85, pp101-03. 
 
U.S. Congress, Office of the Technology Assessment. 1993. Impact of Legal Reforms on 
Medical Malpractice Costs, at 57-75, 105-111.  
 
U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office. 2004. The Effects of Torts Reform: 
Evidence from the States. 
 
U.S Department of Health and Human Services. 2003. Addressing the New Health Care 
Crisis: Reforming the Medical Litigation System to improve the Quality of Health Care 
 
Viscusi, K. (1991). Reforming products liability. Harvard University Press. 
 
Watanabe, Y. (2006). “Learning and Bargaining in Dispute Resolution: Theory and 
Evidence from Medical Malpractice Litigation”, working paper, Kellogg School of 
Management.   33
Tables, Diagrams and Figures 
 
Table 1- Caps on Non-Economic 







AL 400   1991 
IL 500  1995 1997 
MT 250 1995  
ND 500 1995  
SD 500 1996  
OH 500 1997 1999 
OR 500   1999 
ME 400 2000  
MS 500 2003  
OH 500 2003  
OK 300 2004  
TX 250 2004  
FL 450  2004  
TN 250 2005  
NV 350 2005  
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 Appendix A: Characterization of the Equilibria 
 
Solution for states without caps 
At t = 4. High type plaintiff recovers xH while low type plaintiff recovers xL. By its side, 
the defendant pays recovery plus negotiation and litigation costs c + k. 
 
At t = 3. We denote π3 the Bayesian update of the probability that the plaintiff is the low 
type at the beginning of the third period. The cost faced by the defendant C conditional 
on the third period settlement offer S3 is given by  
 
If S3 < δxL then C = δ[π3xL + (1-π3) xH + k] + c          (O1) 
If S3 ∈[δxL,δxH) then C = π3S3 + δ[(1-π3)( xH + k)] + c        (O2) 
If S3 ≥ δxH then C = S3  +   c          ( O 3 )  
 
In the calculation of C, we used the fact that no plaintiff accepts a settlement offer lower 
than the discounted value of his harm (what she obtains at period 4). That structure of 
settlement offers implies that S3 = δxL if and only if π3 >  ) /( k x x k L H + − , otherwise S3 = 
δxH (to see that note that S3 = δxL in (O2) dominates any offer in (O1) or (O2). Hence, in 
order to determine when he should offer δxL or δxH the defendant only needs to 
determine when π3δxL + δ[(1-π3)( xH + k)] is smaller or larger than δxH). In the case, the 
defendant offers S3 = δxL, the low type plaintiff settles while the high type goes to trial, in 
the case that he offers S3 = δxH, both settle. The negotiation costs are irrelevant. 
 
At t = 2. High type plaintiff recovers xH while low type plaintiff recovers xL. High type 
plaintiff never waits for t = 3 because she knows that at that time she can only recover 
δxH. The dominant strategy of the high type immediately implies that π3 = 1, hence the 
low type plaintiff doesn’t have incentives to wait for t = 3 as she gets S3 = δxL with 
certainty. By its side, at t = 2, the defendant pays recovery plus litigation cost k. 
 
At t = 1.  The high (low) type plaintiff accepts all settlement offers higher or equal than 
δxH (δxL) while he rejects all inferior offers. As the defendant knows that the plaintiff can 
get these same amounts in the second period but in that case he pays the litigation cost, he 
induces either both types or the low type to settle immediately. In other words, he makes 
settlement offer δxL when πδxL + (1-π)δ( xH + k) + c < δxH  + c  and settlement offer δxH 
when πδxL + (1-π)δ( xH + k) + c >δxH  + c.  Or; 
 
If π >   then S1 = δxL. In that case, while the low type plaintiff settles 
in the first period, the high type plaintiff litigates in the second and gets δxH. Neither of 
them wants to wait for a third period because in that case they get the same amounts.
NC
L H k x x k π = + − ) /(
38 
                                                 
38 Notice that plaintiffs’ strategy of randomizing between first period settlement and second period trial 
doesn’t support a mixed-strategies equilibrium (after all they get the same payoff) because in that case the 
36 
  
If π <   then S1 = δxH. Both types settle in the first period. 
NC
L H k x x k π = + − ) /(
 
Solution for states with caps 
Unlike in the solution for states without caps, here we distinguish two cases 
 
 
First Case: If   δ
2 x < x
c (caps and low expected trim) then 
 
 
At t = 4. The solution is the same that in the case without caps but instead of recovering  
xH the high type expects to recover x. 
 
At t = 3. The solution is the same that in the case without caps but instead of offering δxL 
and δxH the defendant offers δxL and δ x. 
 
At t = 2. The solution is the same that in the case without caps but instead of recovering  
xH the high type expects to recover x. 
 
At t = 1.  The strategies of the defendant and the plaintiffs are the same that in the case 
without caps with the following exceptions. First, instead of offering δxL and δxH the 
defendant offers δxL or δx
c and second, the high type plaintiff accepts all settlement offers 
higher or equal than δx
c (not δxH) while litigate all inferior offers. The settlement offer in 
the first period depends on the probability that the plaintiff is a low type.  
 
If π  >   then S1 = δxL. While the low type plaintiff settles, the high 
type gets more going to trial. Both actions take place in the first period.  
LTC
L
c k x x k π = + − ) /(
 
If π  <  then S1 = δx
c. Both types settle in the first period. 
LTC
L
c k x x k π = + − ) /(
 
Second Case: If   δ
2 x > x
c (caps and high expected trim) then 
 
At t = 4. High type plaintiff expects to recover x while low type plaintiff recovers xL. By 
its side, the defendant pays recovery plus negotiation and litigation costs c + k. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
defendant can always increase the settlement offer by ε, induce the plaintiffs to accept immediately and 
save the extra negotiation and litigation costs.  
37 
 At t = 3. As in the case without caps, the plaintiffs settle only if they get at least the 
discounted value of their expected recovery at trial in t = 4. That is δxL and δ x 
respectively. The strategy followed by the defendant is the same as in the case without 
caps with two differences: first, instead of offering δxL and δxH he offers δxL and δ x; 
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The defendant could randomize at t = 3 because at time t = 2 both plaintiffs may 
decide to wait for the second settlement offer. The high type has incentives to wait for a 
third period if she gets offer δxL at t = 1 as she cannot recover more than δx
c by going to 
trial at t = 2 and the low type has incentives to wait for a third period because she can get 
more by mimicking the high type.  
 
We define as the probability that the defendant offers δxL in the third period, 
as the probability that the low type plaintiff waits for the third period if she receives 
offer δxL and   as the probability that the high type plaintiff waits for the third period 
if she receives offer δxL. Although we need to wait for the considerations made by the 
defendant at period 1 to determine the exact value of these probabilities, at this point we 


















Hence it is true that 












At t = 2. High type plaintiffs never go to trial because by waiting for a second round of 
settlement/trial they guarantee a recovery of  x
3 δ  which is larger than δx
c. Low type 
plaintiffs wait for period 3 if and only if  (we will see in the analysis at t =1 that it 
is always true that , hence the low type plaintiff never goes to trial. You may 
think that that cannot be true because in the case of a mix strategies solution, the low type 
gets δxL both in the second and third periods, consequently the defendant can always save 
future litigation costs by offering the plaintiff ε more either at t =1 or t = 2 and inducing 
her to accept immediately. But, recall that in the second period the plaintiff cannot get 
more than her true harm, and notice that there is no equilibrium if the defendant always 
accepts the first period offer. 
* π π ≤ 3
* π π = 3
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 At t = 1. The defendant chooses between offering δxL and x
3 δ . If the probability that the 
plaintiff is low type is small enough, the defendant offers x
3 δ , because in that case both 
plaintiffs accept it right away (as they don’t expect to get more if they wait) and the 
defendant saves in future litigation expenses. Instead, if the probability that the plaintiff is 
low type is high enough the defendant offers δxL because in that case some plaintiffs 
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3 1  
Obviously   is the belief that makes the defendant indifferent between the two offers. 
More specifically, the belief that satisfies  
HTC π
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The left hand side expression corresponds to the defendant’s expected cost if the offer is 
δxL. The right hand side expression corresponds to the defendant’s expected cost if the 
offer is x
3 δ . The right hand side expression is completely determined because in the case 
that the offer is  x
3 δ  both types of plaintiff accept it immediately. The left hand side 
expression is not completely determined because we need to calculate the values 
of . First, it is easy to see that  because the high type plaintiff 
never accepts offer δxL as in the third period she can make 
HP LP D p p p   and   , 1 =
HP p
x
3 δ  (remember that the high 
type never goes to trial in the second period as  x
3 δ  > δx
c.) Second, notice that there is no 
equilibrium that supports a pure strategy for the low type plaintiffs. For if the low type 
always accept δxL, the defendant knows at t = 3 that he is dealing with high types and 
offer x δ . As  x
3 δ  > δxL the low type has incentives not to accept at t = 1 and then that 
strategy cannot be an equilibrium. On the other side, if the low type always rejects δxL 
and gets S3 ≥ δxL as expected recovery in the third period the defendant can offer S3 + ε 
and induce her to settle in the first period, saving the extra litigation expenses, hence S1 = 
δxL cannot be an equilibrium.  
 
Now we calculate the values of . Given that the low type follows a mixed 
strategy, she must be indifferent between waiting and settling when he is offered δxL and 
that happens if and only if
LP D p p   and  
) ) ( ( x p L
D =
3 δ x p x
D
L − + 1 δ . That identity allows us to 
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Replacing those expressions in (A1) we get that  
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which leads us to conclude that:  



























1 then S1 = x
3 δ . Both types settle in the 
first period. 










































The high type plaintiff always wait for the third period in which case she settles 
when she receives offer  x δ  but goes to trial when receives offer δxL. The low 












LP p  otherwise she 
settles in the third period, that is, with probability1  .
 
 
Appendix B: Proofs  
Proof of Lemma 1:  
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Proof Proposition 1: 
Part (a) The proof is direct by inspection of (4) and (5). 
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 Part (b) Notice that . Additionally, as the argument of the 
integral in (6) is always larger than the argument of the integral in (4) we have 
that . Consequently, it is enough to show that   is 
decreasing in c, it is increasing in δ and it is increasing in α when c = 0 and δ = 1. The 
conclusion follows from an argument of continuity. 
NC HTC c π α δ π = = = = ) , , ( 1 1 0
NC L > = ) 1 α
HTC c L = = , , ( 1 0 δ
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Proof Proposition 2: 
Part (a) Proposition 2 tells us that the fraction of disputes resolved at trial instead of 
settlement is larger under Regime NC than under Regime LTC. As trials are more 
expensive than settlements, it is direct that litigation expenses are higher under Regime 
NC than under Regime LTC.  
 
Part (b) Expected litigation expenses under Regime NC are 
dx x f k x c E
NC
NC ) ( ) 1 (
1
∫ − + =
π δ                      
While expected litigation expenses under Regime HTC are 
( ) dx x f k p c x c xp c
HTC
D LP ) ( } ) ( { ∫ + − + +
1
3 2 2 1
π
δ δ δ  
















    
First notice that 
HTC E  coincide with 
NC E  when  . ; ; 1 1 0 = = = α δ c  Next we show the 
behavior of   with respect to c, δ and α when we start at point  . c − E
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As the first expression is decreasing in c while the second one increasing in c, we 





























which is positive for all values of δ and 
( )( )
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which is positive for all values of α. Then, by a continuity argument, there must 
exist such that for all it is true that ) , , (
* * * α δ c
* * * , δ δ α α > > <    and      c c
HTC LE  is larger 
than
NC E . 
End Proof. 
 
Proof Proposition 3:  
Part (a): In Regime NC high-type plaintiffs recover δxH for all values of π. In Regime 
LTC high-type plaintiffs recover δx
c for all values of π. In Regime HTC high-type 
plaintiffs recover  x
3 δ  for all values of π. As
c
H x x x > >
2 δ  then the result follows. 
 
Part (b): For all values of   the low-type plaintiffs recover δxH in Regime NC 
which is larger than the maximum recovered in Regimes LTC and HTC given 
by
NC π π <
} , max{
c x x δ δ
3 . For all values of  [ ] } , max{ ,
LTC HTC NC π π π π ∈
c x δ
 the low-type plaintiffs 
recover δxL in Regime NC which is smaller than   which is what they recover in 
Regime LTC and smaller than  x
3 δ  which is what they recover in Regime HTC. Finally, 
for all values of   the low-type plaintiffs recover an expected value of 
δxL in all regimens. 
}
LTC π , max{
HTC π π >
End Proof. 
 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
We provide details for the derivation of , the analysis is analogous for   
and . We show that for all values of  there exists
* α
* c
* δ δ    and    c [ ] 1 0,
* ∈ α  such that for all 
 the expected litigation expenses are larger in a Regime HTC than in Regime NC. 
The rest of the proof follows as in Proposition 2. 
* α > α
 
We call   the litigation expenses in a cycle of 4 periods when there are no-
caps and the recoveries of the high type is x; 
) (x E
NC
LTC E  the litigation expenses in a cycle of 
four periods when the caps involve low expected trim and  the litigation  ) (α
HTC E
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 expenses in a cycle of four periods when the caps involve high expected trim and the caps 
are stroke down with probabilityα . 
Then, in an infinite horizon litigation expenses in HTC are higher than in NC if 
and only if:  
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        The last inequality is satisfied for all the values of  where   is implicitly 
defined by 











) ( ) (
) ( ) (
1


















NC HTC c NC NC
x E x E




    Notice that   because the right hand side expression is decreasing in [ 1 0,
* ∈ α α . It 
takes a value larger than 1 when  0 = α  and a value smaller than 1 when  1 = α  (because 
as indeed we are in a case of LTC and ).  0 ) ( < H x ) 0 ( −
NC HTC E E 0 ) ) 1 ( > −
HTC E E ( H
NC x
End Proof. 
 